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In a recent article in this journal, Ahrne, Brunsson, and Seidl (2016) suggest a deﬁnition of organization as
a ‘decided social order’ composed of ﬁve elements (membership, rules, hierarchies, monitoring, and
sanctions) which rest on decisions. ‘Partial organization’ uses only one or a few of these decidable ele-
ments while ‘complete organization’ uses them all. Such decided orders may also occur outside formal
organizations, as the authors observe. Although we appreciate the idea of improving our understanding
of organization(s) in modern society, we believe that Ahrne, Brunsson, and Seidl's suggestion jeopardizes
the concept of organization by blurring its speciﬁc meaning. As the authors already draw on the work of
Niklas Luhmann, we propose taking this exploration a step further and the potential of systems theory
more seriously. Organizational analysis would then be able to retain a distinctive notion of formal or-
ganization on the one hand while beneﬁting from an encompassing theory of modern society on the
other. With this extended conceptual framework, we would expect to gain a deeper understanding of
how organizations implement and shape different societal realms as well as mediate between their
particular logics, and, not least, how they are related to non-organizational social forms (e.g. families).
© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In a recent article published in this journal, Ahrne, Brunsson and
Seidl (2016) advanced a programmatic claim to “extend the notion
of organization” (p. 93) beyond the current understanding of formal
organizations by putting decisions back at the center of organiza-
tion research. Their claim is complex and extends beyond a
rehashing of historical debates and competition between theories
of formal organization and decision-making approaches. First, their
claim relates formal and decisional aspects of organizations; sec-
ond, it reﬂects recent developments (in theory as well as in




e (V. Tacke).range of organization studies.
Based on recent developments in our ﬁeld, which have empir-
ically and/or theoretically tended to dissociate from organization
studies in the narrow sense, the authors underscore that organi-
zation represents a highly important and very speciﬁc phenome-
non in modern society. Thus, organization is “not a mere reﬂection
of amore general social order that can be adequately understood by
concepts and theories describing society in general” (Ahrne et al.,
2016, p. 93). In other words, the authors suggest that the concept
of organization can be maintained and strengthened by dis-
tinguishing it clearly from other concepts and phenomena in
modern society. By deﬁning organizations as decision-based social
orders, the authors explicitly draw on the latest works of the so-
ciologist Niklas Luhmann (2000b, 2003), who described organiza-
tions as constantly making and reproducing decisions while also
deciding their own structures. With respect to the elements of
formal organizational structure, Ahrne et al. depart from Luhmann
by distinguishing ﬁve basic elements of organization: membership,
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2011, p. 86; Ahrne et al., 2016, p. 95).
Building on this framework, the authors go beyond the classic
concept of formal organization. By making use of the ﬁve formal
elements, they suggest that different degrees of “organizationality”
(Ahrne et al., 2016, p. 98) can be realized on a continuum that
ranges from complete to partial organization. Although a complete
organization would incorporate all ﬁve elements, the authors see
the possibility of so-called “partial organization” (p. 95) that only
uses a few or even one of these elements. Compared with the
classic ideas of organization, a new variety of organizational forms
appears on the agenda, including forms that had not been previ-
ously considered in organization studies but rather were left to
other specialists and addressed by the theory of society, e.g., in the
case of families. However, the authors not only advocate for a
speciﬁc theory of organization that will lead to a better under-
standing of the phenomenon, but they explicitly claim that
expanding the concept of organization will provide “insights […]
necessary for understanding modern society” (Ahrne et al., 2016, p.
93).
Ahrne et al. touch on a sore spot. As US scholars stress, organi-
zation studies are “facing a kind of existential crisis” (Barley, 2016,
p. 3; see also similarly Davis, 2014; Gorman, 2014) because orga-
nizations seem to morph furiously into new forms, and “old the-
ories are no longer as relevant as they once were” (p. 2). However,
Ahrne et al. make clear that European organization studies have
already spawned means for understanding such new forms of
organization.
We concur that a criterion is required so that organizations can
be understood as a speciﬁc form of social order, and we believe that
this criterion can be found in the peculiarity of organizational
decision-making. Further, we also agree that organizational the-
ories already have the means to understand “organizational” phe-
nomena, which may initially appear to be outside the scope of the
traditional conceptualization of organizations.
However, we believe that the contribution of Ahrne et al. pre-
sents twomajor difﬁculties. The ﬁrst difﬁculty concerns the current
idea of partial organization. As the authors make clear, partial or-
ganization can represent (1) a formal organization that only uses
some of the possible ﬁve structural elements, and (2) certain
structural elements that exist outside of formal organizations, such
as standards. These forms of organization are all considered
“decided orders.” Therefore, we argue that although Ahrne et al.
want to sharpen the distinctiveness of the concept of organization,
their proposal threatens to blur the lines even more and to result in
the loss of a distinctive concept of formal organization.
Our second concern is related to Ahrne et al.’s claim that their
proposal can offer insights for understanding modern society. As
sociologists, we assert that the authors' reﬂections on society fall
short because they fail to connect their theory of organization with
a key insight of sociological theory: the concept that modern so-
ciety is differentiated into distinctive realms of social reality
deﬁned by others as “societal sectors” (Scott&Meyer, 1983), “social
ﬁelds” (Bourdieu, 1988), “value spheres” (Weber, 1946), “social
worlds” (Guston, 2001) or “subsystems of society” (Luhmann,
1994). Ahrne et al. avoid using a similar societal theory and limit
themselves to general remarks on the relevance of “decided orders”
as distinctive phenomena used to understand society. Therefore,
Ahrne et al. cannot provide an explanation of how organizations
and their decision-based processes are related to other forms of
social order. Although Ahrne et al. (2016, p. 94) criticize Neo-
Institutionalism for not presenting an elaborated theory of orga-
nizations when trying to understand the relationship between or-
ganizations and society, we are concerned that an attempt to
understand this relationship with a theory of organization butwithout a theory of modern society introduces the same ﬂaw only
in the other direction.
We believe that both problems stem from the fact that the au-
thors do not take their underlying Luhmannian framework seri-
ously enough. The sociological theory of Niklas Luhmann offers a
far more radical perspective of how we can understand organiza-
tions as systems of decisions and an elaborated understanding of
modern society. By thoroughly acknowledging Luhmann's con-
cepts, one can more clearly show how organizations play a major
role in modern society. Our response is structured as follows.
First, we introduce a radical concept of formal organization by
returning to the Luhmannian deﬁnition of an organization as
interconnected decision processes. In our view, it is not simply the
capability to make a decision but the process of interconnected
decision making that constitutes the difference between formal
organizations and other social orders. Second, we suggest that the
role of organization(s) in our society can be understood only if we
are able to sociologically describe modes of building order, which
differs from organizational order. We argue that the concept of
institution is too weak and return to the Luhmannian concept of
functional differentiation to describe the building of order in
different societal realms. In the last step, we elaborate on how a
radicalized version of Ahrne et al.’s proposal can be used for
empirical research on the role of organizations in society. Thus, our
contribution supports Ahrne et al.'s (2016) effort to place “organi-
zation studies at the heart of social sciences” (p. 99).
2. Organizations and beyond
Ahrne et al. as well as Ahrne and Brunsson (2011) built their
analysis of organization on the crucial idea that decisions are the
central feature of organization, and they deﬁne organization (i.e., in
the singular) as “decided social order.” The idea of Ahrne et al.
(2016) is that the “concept of organization as ‘decided order’ al-
lows for the transfer of the term to other domains outside formal
organization, while simultaneously preserving its distinctiveness”
(p. 95).
Based on the authors' new conceptualization of the term, “or-
ganization” can be used to describe several decided social orders
that encompass decisions on at least one of the following elements:
rules, hierarchies, membership, monitoring, and sanctions. In this
respect, the authors see a continuum of degrees of “organization-
ality” (Ahrne et al., 2016, p. 98). If a decided order uses all ﬁve
structural elements, it is denoted complete organization. If the or-
der only uses certain elements, it is called partial organization.
However, Ahrne et al. also maintain a notion of formal organization
and, interestingly, suggest that formal organizations can be com-
plete or partial:
“This conception of organization opens up the possibility that
organization may come in parts, such that only one or a few
elements of organization are actually used within or outside a
formal organization.” (Ahrne et al., 2016, p. 95)
From our perspective, this duality leads to considerable confu-
sion because a formal organization can be a partial organization
while partial organization can also be a type of organization that is
outside of a formal organization. What distinguishes formal orga-
nizations from other decided orders outside of them? Unfortu-
nately, Ahrne et al. do not present a clear answer to this question.
To overcome this ambiguity, we propose applying the concept of
organization elaborated by Niklas Luhmann, which Ahrne et al.
build on but do not entirely adopt. Luhmann (2000b, 2003) offers a
radical understanding of formal organizations (i.e., in the plural) as
systems of decisions (see also Seidl & Becker, 2006; Seidl, 2005).
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also constituted by ongoing decision-making processes: “Organi-
zation is not about single decision makers and their individual at-
tempts but about decision making as a process, about linking
decisions” (Tacke, 2014, p. 10). Thus, organizations build an inter-
connected network of ongoing “processes of decisions, whereby
one decision calls forth ensuing decisions, resulting in a self-
reproducing stream of decision” (Ahrne et al., 2016, p. 95),
whereas other elements are excluded. This aspect of organizations
leads to the insight that organizations gain unique decision-making
capabilities and complexity that are lacking in other types of social
systems.
Moreover, this concept emphasizes a dynamic view of organi-
zations and directs the analytical gaze to the question of how cur-
rent decisions link to former decisions. By acknowledging this
connection, the analysis of how decisions connect to each other
becomes central: in formal organizations, the link between de-
cisions is guaranteed above all by formal structures, which are
themselves a matter of decision and function as speciﬁc premises
for subsequent decisions (Seidl & Becker, 2006; Seidl, 2005). For
example, organizational decision-making capabilities make it
possible to decide on hierarchies or rules that do not have to be
constantly (re-)negotiated while maintaining the possibility of
changing these rules by making new decisions. Therefore, we
acknowledge that the elements described by the concept of partial
organization (membership, rules, hierarchies, monitoring, sanc-
tions) are helpful for making sense of the different structural ele-
ments that facilitate the link with subsequent decisions in a speciﬁc
organization.We also acknowledge Ahrne et al.'s view that a formal
organization can also decide not to make decisions regarding some
of these elements. Therefore, different types of organizations
might, for example, differ on how membership is deﬁned or not
deﬁned.
This concept can be used to disband the old concept of organi-
zation, in which enterprises and public administrations are proto-
typical forms and that considers all ﬁve structural elements listed
by Ahrne et al. as constitutive. Applying the Luhmannian concept of
organization, we can, for example, also analyze organizations, such
as parties or associations, that are essential in a democratic society
but do not have hierarchies similar to those of enterprises and use
limited sanctioning instruments. Additionally, meta-organizations,
which are described by Ahrne et al. (2016, p. 96), are formal orga-
nizations that partially use decided structures. Moreover, this
concept can be beneﬁcial for analyzing new forms of organizations,
such as virtual organizations, project organizations, and hacker
collectives, in which aspects such as membership are contested or
unclear (see Dobusch & Schoeneborn, 2015; Schrey€ogg & Sydow,
2010).
Based on these reﬂections and in accordance with the tradition
of organizational studies, we want to reemphasize the necessity of
developing a speciﬁc understanding of formal organization as a
modern phenomenon with distinctive features. By understanding
formal organizations as operatively closed systems of ongoing
interconnected decision processes, we assert that the distinction
between “complete” and “partial” organization is only valid at the
structural level and not the constitutional level of organizations.
Moreover, although we agree that the ﬁve listed elements are
important structural elements of formal organizations, an expla-
nation of this selection of elements is necessary (e.g., why are
formal goals or department structures not considered?) e not least
to justify the idea of “completeness.” Consequently, we suggest
renouncing the distinction between partial and complete organi-
zation. While this distinction deﬁnes organization by listing
structural features and leaves open the implications of “complete
organization”, we favor considering organizations as decisionsystems, which deﬁnes them by identifying their constitutive
operating principle (Luhmann, 2003; Seidl & Becker, 2006).
Moreover, we believe that another distinction developed by
Ahrne et al. could be placed at the forefront of organizational
analysis: the distinction between institutional orders and decided
orders. We will outline how this distinction can be placed in the
forefront in the following section.
3. Organizations and society
Thus far, our discussion has focused on the concept of organi-
zation, but the discussion should extend beyond organizational
borders. Organizations make decisions on their own structures but
also make decisions that affect society more broadly (e.g., when
they decide on standards). Therefore, organizations establish
decided orders. Moreover, decisions also occur outside of formal
organizations (e.g., in families), and these decisions can create new
decided orders. Decided orders can differ regarding the structural
elements they include: membership, rules, monitoring, sanctions,
or hierarchy (Ahrne et al., 2016).
In this respect, we agreewith Ahrne et al. that there is a lotmore
decided order in the world than it is usually presumed. However,
we assert that to understand these phenomena, we need not only a
theory of organization but also a theory of what an organization is
not, which means that we need a theory of society. Concerning the
analysis of society, Ahrne et al. (2016) refer to institutions and
distinguish between “decided orders” and “institutional orders”;
therefore, they make a connection to the framework of neo-
institutionalism. Institutional orders are understood as emergent
orders that are not a result of decisions. However, we suggest that a
consideration of the concept of institutions does not lead to a suf-
ﬁcient understanding of societal order. Indeed, neo-institutionalists
have recently started to categorize institutions into coherent logics
on a societal level (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio,
2008); however, they are not able to deﬁne the constitutive fea-
tures of these logics in a convincing way (Besio & Meyer, 2015). In
contrast, the theory of society by Luhmann offers adequate con-
cepts to describe modern heterogeneity.
In fact, the Luhmannian framework already combines a
decision-based understanding of organization with a modern un-
derstanding of society. Although Niklas Luhmann's oeuvre consists
of an extensive body of studies on organizations, including several
books (e.g., Luhmann, 1964, 1978, 2000b) and various articles (e.g.,
1976, 1982, 2003, 2006), his organization theory only represents
one building block in a comprehensive two-fold theory. In contrast
to “many scholars, like Bourdieu, Giddens, or Habermas, who pre-
sented general societal theories during the late 20th century” but
“no concept or theory of organization” (Ahrne et al., 2016, p. 93),
Luhmann indeed presented an initial theory of organization (see
Hasse, 2005; Seidl & Mormann, 2014) and then outlined a general
societal theory that always included organizations (see, e.g.,
Luhmann, 1982, 1995, 2000a, 2012, 2013; see also Seidl, 2005; Seidl
& Becker, 2006; Turner, 2013).
3.1. Functional differentiation
According to Luhmann, modern society is primarily functionally
differentiated into distinctive realms: the subsystems of society
(Luhmann, 1977, 1987, 1988, 1994; for a brief introduction, see also
Seidl, 2005; Seidl & Becker, 2006; Turner, 2013). These subsystems
include politics, economics, justice, medicine, science, education,
mass media, art, religion, sports, the sphere of intimate relation-
ships and nuclear families (Luhmann, 2012, 2013) and possibly
more. Each societal subsystem has its speciﬁc logic that is deﬁned
by the orientation to a binary code that serves as a guiding
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munications). For example, the economic system orients its oper-
ations along the distinction of having/not having (Luhmann, 1989,
p. 52); thus, it includes all communications concerned with the
distribution of scarce resources. Therefore, societal subsystems can
be considered systems because they are constituted by inter-
connected networks of communication, which in each case are
oriented to only one system-speciﬁc code. These systems are not
organizations. Indeed, the subsystems gain their modern
complexity from the fact that they are not reducible to just one
organization or one hierarchy (Luhmann, 2013, p. 150).
To show that societal subsystems are speciﬁc forms of social
order and cannot be reduced to decision-making processes, we
examine the case of families as an example. On a societal level, the
sphere of nuclear families and intimate relationships can be
considered a societal subsystem (Luhmann, 2012, 2013) because of
the logic of love, which orients communication in this societal
sphere (Morgner, 2014). We choose this example because Ahrne
et al. provocatively consider families as organization (Ahrne et al.,
2016, p. 98).
As Ahrne (2015) outlined in another paper, a greater degree of
decision-making occurs in families and romantic relationships than
is commonly assumed: “how to arrange for their marriage, what
they can expect from each other, whether they are going to have
children” (Ahrne et al., 2016, p. 98). Indeed, modern couples can
decide on such issues relatively independently (Ahrne, 2015). In
pre-modern families, this was not possible because families were
not only families but also economic production collectives. Their
structures were determined by the necessities of production and
reproduction as well as by estatist norms.
Modern families are no longer burdened by these institution-
alized orders. Instead, love and cohesion are crucial and allow for
the development of families as distinctive social systems that can
be distinguished from economic entities (Luhmann, 2012, 2013).
However, does family become an “organizational form” as pro-
posed by Ahrne et al. (2016, p. 98)? Does the presence of elements
of decided order in families make the family an organization? We
tend to disagree. Indeed, although decisions are made within
families, families are not based on or constructed by decisions.
Instead, they are based on cohesion and the societal logic of love.
Family members do not take formalized roles but rather commu-
nicate with the expectation that they will be fully acknowledged as
a person with a distinct and complete personality. Families are
constituted and stabilized based on love, not their decisions, and
especially love implies that one has not made a decision (Seidl,
2005, p. 39), but just happens to love the other and vice versa.
Although it might be true that membership in families is well-
deﬁned (Ahrne et al., 2016, p. 98), this membership usually can
hardly be considered to be a matter of decisions: one does not
decide to love the other, and a child does not decide to become a
child nor can it relinquish its family membership. Instead, a family
is a collective based on regular interactions through which the
relationship among the family members grows stronger and un-
decided norms emerge. Therefore, although families must make
numerous decisions in everyday life and this could be a fruitful
research topic, we do not consider families to represent an entity
that becomes a decision-based system.
3.2. Close relationship between organizations and society
The close relationship between organizations and society can be
understood by considering it from a historical-evolutionary
perspective. Organizations are a product of modern society, and
only a functionally differentiated society requires organizations.
Therefore, modern society would not exist in its current formwithout organizations, and organizations are only possible and
necessary in modern society (Schoeneborn et al., 2014). This rela-
tionship implies a complementary thesis: organizations did not
occur in older societies.
“Traditional social places” in these societies primarily included
households and guilds. Even if guilds are to a certain extent the
precursors of modern organizations, they are completely different
in a number of respects. First, members were included „totally“,
that is, without distinguishing between personal and role behavior.
People were born, lived, and died in the same place, and time was
the “natural” time of aging, not the time of work contracts. Work
did not require individual motivation, and guilds did not need
membership selection criteria. Second, the internal structures of
the guilds mirrored the general hierarchical societal structure; for
example, ofﬁcers and bishops as well as the guilds' public repre-
sentatives were members of the aristocracy (see Schwinek€oper,
1985).
Let us take a closer look at the example of politics. Historically,
politics were not organized. The medieval courts communicated on
the basis of certain criteria, such as virtue, friendship/hostility, ri-
valry, secret knowledge, etc., and interactions at the court around
the king and the network of households outside the court were
both necessary and sufﬁcient. Consequently, courts were based on
institutional order and not on decisions. This began to change in the
17th century (in England perhaps earlier) and politics began to be
organized on the basis of decisions, such as selective behavior,
which always has alternatives and must prove itself in the public
sphere. Interests collate into organized parties, and administrations
require ofﬁcials and procedures, which are no longer based on the
quality of the nobility but require training and decisional premises
(Zaret, 2000). Finally, modern politics requires organizations (i.e.,
central governments, political parties, lobbies, etc.), but it is not
limited to these organizations. Politics is only an example, and
similar conclusions can be extended to the economy, science, and
most other societal subsystems.3.3. Organizational re-speciﬁcation of the logics of societal
subsystems
Consequently, organizations play a crucial role in the Luhman-
nian concept of society. The “emergence of organizations as a new
type of social system was a precondition for the modern, func-
tionally differentiated society” (Schoeneborn et al., 2014, p. 297). In
modern society, one cannot rely on traditional norms or authorities
that are taken for granted; rather, one must decide on almost every
issue. In addition, systems such as politics, justice, or economics
depend on decisions to operate, and these decisions can only be
delivered in the necessary quantity and quality by organizations.
Although the guiding codes of societal subsystems are necessarily
diffuse, organizations are able to concretize and implement these
codes; thus, organizations can re-specify the logics of the societal
subsystems so that decisions can be made (Drepper, 2005, p. 178;
von Groddeck, 2013, p. 193). Because of their ability to make de-
cisions and decide on structures, i.e., the creation of decided orders,
organizations facilitate the management of modern society's
complexity by making subsystems' logics decidable. Consequently,
organizations have an important role in applying the codes as well
as in shaping the code-related norms of societal subsystems. For
example, the economic system relies on organizations to distribute
goods and money; the legal system relies on organizations in the
form of courts to make decisions on legal or illegal acts; and the
political system needs organizations to decide on party leaders and
candidates for president and to produce collectively binding
decisions.
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Another aspect we would like to highlight is the importance of
organizations for mediating the relationships among different
subsystems (see Drepper, 2005). Because the operations of societal
subsystems are speciﬁc and autonomous, they cannot directly
connect to each other. Consequently, the question arise: How can
we understand their relationship? For example, how can we
explain that political decision-making affects education and how
do scientiﬁc ﬁndings inﬂuence economic development? The Luh-
mannian theory states that organizations play a crucial role in
connecting different logics, which occurs via the relationships be-
tween organizations and within organizations.
First, organizations are capable of communicating with each
other (Luhmann, 2013, p. 145), whereas societal subsystems cannot
communicate with each other. For example, in the case of science, it
is difﬁcult to imagine science as an actor capable of communicating
with other systems. However, a number of scientiﬁc organizations,
such as universities, research institutes or scientiﬁc associations,
can communicate with political or economic organizations to
negotiate funding.
Second, organizations are “multi-referential” (Stichweh, 2015, p.
29), meaning that in their decision-making, they can take different
logics into consideration. Moreover, organizations can manage
economic, juridical, scientiﬁc, educational and other logics simul-
taneously (Besio&Meyer, 2015; von Groddeck, 2011; Kette& Tacke,
2015). For example, enterprises manage ﬁnancial matters as well as
research programs, sports teams, legal departments, etc. Churches
implement religious practices but also require revenue; therefore,
they make investments. Organizations are entities that orchestrate
several rationalities through their activities (Andersen, 2003) by
ﬁne-tuning and channeling their mutual inﬂuence. The Luhman-
nian perspective acknowledges that organizations are capable of
deciding how they incorporate and couple differing logics (see
Luhmann, 2013, p. 151), and in recent years, fruitful discussions
have taken place on this topic in organizational studies (e.g.,
Andersen, 2003; Besio &Meyer, 2015; von Groddeck, 2011; Kette &
Tacke, 2015; Roth, 2014).
3.5. Impact on society
Organizations are shaped by society and in turn shape society.
Organizations reproduce the operations of societal subsystems, and
in doing so, they constantly alter the social orders of societal sub-
systems through their decisions. Every simple and ongoing strategy
for re-specifying external requirements can have consequences
beyond organizational borders. Once an organizational solution is
applied, it may be copied by other organizations and become the
object of public debate, thereby unleashing innovation processes,
among other effects.
Moreover, organizations are powerful actors that can also
impact society with active strategies, such as lobbying. Organiza-
tions also affect society by making decisions on rules for others. In
the words of Ahrne et al., organizations create and alter decided
orders as well as replace institutional orders with decided orders.
Therefore, “standards” as described by Ahrne et al. (2016, p. 96)
represent an important example of organizational power and are a
consequence of organizational decision-making processes. Once
enacted, these standards can function as decided orders for several
organizations and actors in different ﬁelds. Therefore, standards are
decision premises as well as outputs of organizational decision
making; however, they are not themselves organizations.
Examples of organizations developing standards are easily
identiﬁable in several ﬁelds, such as national or international pol-
itics, education, economy, social work, etc. For instance, the issue ofpublication ethics in the societal subsystem of science is an inter-
esting example because what was once an institutional social order
has now becomemainly shaped by an organization. The Committee
on Publication Ethics (COPE), a formal organization founded in
1997, has developed codes of conduct and best-practice guidelines
on publication ethics that are currently applied by many scientiﬁc
publishers and journals. The implications are substantial because
this development means that ethical standards for scientiﬁc pub-
lication no longer just happen to be there. Those are now decided
and can be decided otherwise in the future.
4. Re-visiting the research agenda
A more comprehensive integration of Luhmann's theory of
modern society with the ideas of Ahrne et al. leads to the following
questions concerning the relationship between organizations and
society:
4.1. How do organizations re-specify the codes of the societal
subsystems?
One can observe that different subsystems have different de-
pendencies on organizations. Economics and politics strongly rely
on organizations, whereas families and love-based relationships as
a societal sphere are not based on organizations. Moreover,
different types of organizations develop within different sub-
systems. For example, although public administrations are typically
framed by formal rules, universities are more similar to anarchies
(see Cohen & March, 1974). Additionally, different types of orga-
nizations may be present within one subsystem. For example, the
logic of the societal subsystem of mass media is concretized in
different ways; thus, in addition to traditional editorial ofﬁces, new
organizational forms are also observed, such as partially structured
“latent organizations” (Starkey, Barnatt, & Tempest, 2000). In these
organizations, individuals and teams coordinate in a temporary
project-based manner. In this respect, Ahrne et al.’s heuristic of the
partially structured formal organization may provide an opportu-
nity to analyze different forms of re-speciﬁcation of societal sub-
systems and their consequences.
4.2. How do organizations mediate between the different logics of
societal subsystems?
Recent insights show that organizations can creatively combine
different logics. For example, Besio and Meyer (2015) distinguish
three forms of combining differing logics within formal organiza-
tions: loose coupling, translating and interfacing. All these strategies
rely on structural elements, which are decided on by organizations.
In such an analysis, the ﬁve elements listed by Ahrne et al. are of
relevance. For example, loose coupling may occur via the estab-
lishment of separate departments that operate according to
different logics and the simultaneous coupling of these de-
partments at selected points, such as through speciﬁc monitoring
devices. Furthermore, organizations can translate one societal logic
into another and then decide on rules that regulate such trans-
lation. For example, for certain “social entrepreneurs,” humanitar-
ian aid coincides with helping a local economy, and these
organizations set rules that prescribe the continuation of humani-
tarian aid projects that are compatible with economic purposes.
Moreover, organizations connect different societal subsystems by
building interfaces. In particular, organizations can make decisions
that establish speciﬁc “boundary objects” (Star & Griesemer, 1989),
which are structures perceived as relevant and applicable by
different subsystems. These boundary objects can be departments,
positions, speciﬁc programs or single members. For example, the
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tional as well as scientiﬁc logic.
An open question in this respect is related to the roles played by
different decided orders with respect to mediating different logics.
Can formal organizations use speciﬁc structural elements for the
mediation of speciﬁc logics? How can mediation by decided orders
outside of formal organization succeed?
4.3. How do organizations impact society?
Organizations reproduce and alter the code-related norms of
societal subsystems by providing decisions that are binding both
for themselves and for others. Organizations can co-shape societal
structures. The forms by which organizations affect society are
manifold. Organizations can make a new solution available, deﬁne
standards or engage in public debates; however, the success of their
interventions is never guaranteed. The implementation of their
decisions beyond their borders can be complicated by misleading
interpretations, insufﬁcient resources, and incompatibility with
existing routines. In this process, Ahrne et al. indicate a crucial
difﬁculty concerning decided orders: because they are the results of
choices between alternatives, they can always be questioned.
Therefore, these orders are more fragile than institutional orders.
This idea opens the way for research concerning the conditions in
which organizational decision-making succeeds beyond the bor-
ders of the organization, i.e., how the decided orders are accepted
and legitimized outside of formal organizations.
4.4. How are decisions made outside of organizations?
The described lines of research allow us to explain how formal
organizations manage societal complexity while also transforming
society with their decisions. Additionally, the approach of Ahrne
et al. allows us to consider decided orders that are not a result of
organizational decision-making. Decisions are also made outside of
organizations, e.g., in small groups, families, epistemic commu-
nities, networks, etc., in contexts that are not constituted by de-
cisions. Additionally, in the realm of societal subsystems, such as
economy or science, decisions do not always originate in organi-
zations. Using the example of families, which are not formal or-
ganizations but still make decisions, we argue that the heuristic
instrument developed by Ahrne et al. can help us understand how
families borrow decision and coordination forms from formal or-
ganizations, which calls into question the circumstances that lead
families to make certain types of decisions as well as the conse-
quences of these decisions.
5. Concluding remarks
We agree with Ahrne et al. that organization theory is under
strain, which can partially be explained by the inability of organi-
zation theory to successfully analyze the relationship between or-
ganizations and society. Indeed, neo-institutionalism has put this
issue at the heart of its analyses; however, by stressing that orga-
nizations primarily reﬂect external societal orders, a deﬁnition of
an organization as a speciﬁc phenomenon becomes superﬂuous,
which negates the usefulness of the analytical instruments of or-
ganization theory. Ahrne et al. attempted to counteract this trend
by reminding us that society consists of institutionalized orders as
well as decided orders.
However, in their attempt to highlight the role of decided or-
ders, Ahrne et al. tended to overstretch the concept of organization.
Therefore, the concept of formal organization was reduced to
decided orders, while society became weakly deﬁned by the
distinction between decided and institutional orders. Therefore, wesuggest that the sociological theory of Niklas Luhmann, which is
already present in Ahrne et al.’s approach, should be more thor-
oughly considered. Luhmann offers a speciﬁc deﬁnition of formal
organizations as complex decision systems and provides an
encompassing description of modern society as functionally
differentiated. Combining the Luhmannian concept of formal or-
ganizationwith Ahrne et al.'s approach would clarify the concept of
organization. As a result, we suggest distinguishing between formal
organizations as systems of interconnected decision-making and
decided order as the structural elements decided on.
Furthermore, providing a sharp distinction between organiza-
tions and society makes it possible to describe a variety of re-
lationships. In particular, one can analyze how formal organizations
implement, mediate, and at the same time change different societal
logics. In this context, the ﬁve structural elements described by
Ahrne et al. can function as heuristics for observing the type of
structural decisions organizations make in different ﬁelds, with
different objectives and consequences. Moreover, we see the pos-
sibility to inquire how decisions and decided order come about
outside formal organization, and how they affect society and its
subsystems. Furthermore, the combination of the two perspectives
may be utilized to trace replacements and transformations of
structural elements, such as membership, rules, etc., in different
social systems, which allows for an analysis of their historical
developments.
Ahrne et al. (2016) aim to resurrect organization as a central
object of research to gain “fundamental insights into the workings
of our world” (p. 99). Although we highlighted several major dif-
ﬁculties in their approach, we generally embrace their claims. Our
purpose is to add to their proposal by offering a more speciﬁc
concept of organization and a comprehensive and fully compatible
concept of society. By doing so, we hope to resurrect organization as
a distinctive concept but seek to avoid renouncing an elaborated
notion of modern society. We believe that such a combination has
the potential to establish “organization studies at the heart of social
sciences” (Ahrne et al., 2016, p. 99).
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